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McConathy: Telephone Consumer Protection Act

COMMENT

DESTINATION VENTURES, LTD. V. F.C.C.
AND MOSER v. F.C.C.: HOW MUCH SHOULD
THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION
ACT RESTRICT YOUR PHONE, FAX AND
COMPUTER?
1. INTRODUCTION
As new technology emerges, the appearance of
related legal issues seems never to be far behind .... 1

The Ninth Circuit upheld the constitutionality of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act2 (hereinafter "TCPA") in two
February 1995 decisions: Destination Ventures, Ltd. v. F.C.C. 3
and Moser v. F.C.C. 4 Destination Ventures marked the first
examination of the TCPA by any United States Court of Appeals. 5 In that case, the Ninth Circuit held that the TCPA ban
1. Lutz Appellate Servo V. Curry, 859 F. Supp. 180, 181 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (referring to fax machine use prohibitions of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act).
2. 47 U.S.C. § 227 (Supp. V 1993).
3. Destination Ventures, Ltd. V. F.C.C., 46 F.3d 54 (9th Cir. 1995) (per
Fletcher, J., joined by Nelson and Rymer, JJ.), affg 844 F. Supp. 632 (D. Or.
1994). Plaintiffs did not appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court due to the high costs
of continued litigation and because the TCPA provision restricting unsolicited
faxing was not aggressively enforced by the Federal Communications Commission.
See Kit R. Roane, Court Upholds Law Banning Unsolicited Fax Ads, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 24, 1995, at B6.
4. Moser v. F.C.C., 46 F.3d 970 (9th Cir. 1995) (opinion by Fletcher, J.,
joined by Nelson and Rymer, JJ.), rev'g 811 F. Supp. 541 (D. Or. 1992) (granting
preliminary injunction), and rev'g 826 F. Supp. 360 (D. Or. 1993) (granting summary judgment and declaring the TCPA subsection unconstitutional), cert. denied,
115 S. Ct. 2615 (1995).
5. Andrea Gerlin, Business Tired of Faxed Ads Sue the Senders, THE WALL
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on unsolicited facsimile (hereinafter "fax") advertising was a
constitutional regulation of commercial speech since the provision reasonably fit the government interest in preventing advertisement cost-shifting to the consumer.6 Five days later, in
Moser, the same three-judge panel reversed a district court
decision and upheld the TCPA's bar of prerecorded telephone
sales messages. 7 The Ninth Circuit held that automated
telemarketing threatens residential privacy which justifies
narrowly tailored statutory restrictions on such marketing
methods. 8
This comment examines and attempts to reconcile these
two Ninth Circuit decisions with prior Supreme Court holdings
involving constitutional challenges to commercial speech regulations. 9 It concludes that both Destination Ventures and
Moser are consistent with the Constitution and with the
Congress' desire to avoid advertising cost-shifting.lo However,
it suggests that the court exaggerated or overemphasized the
harms caused by telemarketing and unsolicited fax advertising
in upholding the corresponding regulations. l l Finally, it recommends· that the TePA be expanded to encompass other
types of unsolicited faxing and to restrict advertising on the
Internet. 12

STREET JOURNAL, May 9, 1995, at Bl. See Lysaght v. New Jersey, 837 F. Supp.
646, 647 (D. N.J. 1993) (The Oregon district court in Moser was the first federal
court to review the TePA's constitutionality.).
6. Destination Ventures, 46 F.3d at 55-56.
7. Moser, 46 F.3d at 975.
8. Id.
9. See infra notes 84-142 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 143-46 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 147-73 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 174-220 and accompanying text. The Internet is an information clearinghouse connecting millions of users worldwide through phone lines,
modems, and computers. Kit R. Roane, Court Upholds Law Banning Unsolicited
Fax Ads, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 1995, at B6. One computer expert estimates that
today nearly 50 million users worldwide access the Internet on a regular basis.
Stephen McGookin, FT Review of Business Books, THE FINANCIAL TIMES, Sept. 27,
1995. Most users access the Internet through commercial servers who charge setup and on-line fees in exchange for the use of host computers. See Aggi Raeder,
Internet World 95: An Eyewitness Report, INFORMATION TODAY, May 1, 1995, at 57.
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II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. DESTINATION VENTURES, LTD.

v.

F.C.C.

Prior to the enactment of the TCPA, many travel agents,
stockbrokers, and other small businesses promoted their enterprises through fax advertising. 13 Before the TCPA ban took
effect, Destination Ventures, an Oregon company, used fax
advertising to promote its training programs for travel
agents.14 Other small businesses, including a paralegal service (Lutz Paralegal Service), a fax number listing service
(National Faxlist), an investment capital company (Porter
Capital Corporation) and a travel agency (Lock Travel Service),
also advertised in this manner.15 The TCPA prohibits any person from sending unsolicited advertising by fax. 16 As a result,
these five businesses, which desired to continue sending or
receiving unsolicited faxes, challenged the constitutionality of
the TCPA. 17 Specifically, they sought to enjoin the Federal
Communication Commission (hereinafter "F.C.C.") from enforcing the prohibition on using telephone facsimile machines to
send unsolicited advertisements. IS
In June 1993, plaintiffs filed suit in the Oregon federal
district court claiming that the TCPA violated their "free
speech and equal protection rights."19 The district court analyzed the constitutionality of the restriction to assure it reasonably fit a substantial government purpose. 20 The court found
the provision constitutional because it was narrowly tailored to

13. See Destination Ventures, Ltd. v. F.C.C., 46 F.3d 54, 55 (9th Cir. 1995).
14. [d.

15. See Destination Ventures, Ltd. v. F.C.C., 844 F. Supp. 632, 634 (D. Or.
1994).
16. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(C) (Supp. V 1993).
17. Destination Ventures, 844 F. Supp. at 634.
18. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(C) (Supp. V 1993). This subsection states in relevant
part: "It shall be unlawful for any person within the United States . . . to use
any telephone facsimile machine, computer, or other device to send an unsolicited
advertisement to a telephone facsimile machine." [d.
"Unsolicited advertisement" includes material which "advertis[es] the commercial availability or quality of any property, goods, or services which is transmitted to any person without that person's prior express invitation or permission."
[d. at § 227(a)( 4).
19. Destination Ventures, 844 F. Supp. at 634.
20. 1d. at 637-39.
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prevent the unfair shifting of advertising costs to the fax owner.21 According to the court, cost-shifting to consumers was an
economic harm the TCPA sought to avoid. 22 Thus, the district
court granted the F.C.C.'s motion to dismiss for failure to state
a claim upon which relief could be granted. 23 Destination Ventures appealed the district court dismissal to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. 24
B. MOSER V. F.C.C.

Unlike Destination Ventures, Kathryn Moser's
telemarketing association utilized automated calling machines
to solicit business. 25 Moser used artificial or prerecorded voice
messages to deliver advertisements and other information to
residential telephone customers.26 Typically, these calls were
conducted without the previous consent of the called party.27
Moser and her telemarketing group challenged the constitutionality of TCPA subsection which prohibits placing automated calls to private residences without the called party's
consent. 28 Plaintiffs claimed that this subsection restricted
their First Amendment rights and sought to enjoin its enforcement by the F.C.C. 29
21. 1d. at 640.
22. 1d. at 636.
23. 1d. at 640.
24. Destination Ventures, 46 F.3d at 54.
25. Moser v. F.C.C., 46 F.3d 970, 972 n.1 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 115 S.
Ct. 2615 (1995). Kathryn Moser served as president of a small trade group, the
National Association of Telecomputer Operators (hereinafter "NATO"), which represented businesses using telecomputer marketing. 1d. at 973. Both Moser and
NATO were named plaintiffs in the appeal. 1d. at 970.
26. 1d. at 972. Some telemarketers use automatic dialer recorded message
players or automated dialing and announcing devices to dial over 1,000 telephone
numbers per day. S. REP. No. 178, 102d Cong., 1st. Sess. 2-3 (1991), reprinted in
1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. (105 Stat. 2395) 1968, 1970.
27. See Moser v. F.C.C., 826 F. Supp. 360, 361 (D. Or. 1993).
28. 1d. See 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(B) (Supp. V 1993). This subsection states, in
part: "It shall be unlawful for any person within the United States ... (B) to
initiate any telephone call to any residential telephone line using an artificial or
prerecorded voice to deliver a message without the prior express consent of the
called party. . . ." 1d.
29. Moser v. F.C.C., 811 F. Supp. 541, 542 (D. Or. 1992). See generally U.S.
CONST. amend. I. ("Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
speech. . . .").
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Plaintiffs filed suit in the United States District Court for
the District of Oregon seeking injunctive relief and a declaratory judgment.3o In December 1992, the court temporarily enjoined enforcement of the pertinent subsection until its constitutionality could be determined. 31 In May 1993, the court
ruled that the TCPA provision unconstitutionally restricted
protected commercial speech.,,32 The district court determined
that the ban did not sufficiently advance the government's
substantial interest in protecting residential privacy since
automated calls constitute only a small percentage of all
telemarketing. 33 The court granted plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and later declared the subsection unconstitutiona1. 34 The F.C.C. appealed the decision to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. 35
III. BACKGROUND
A. DEFINING COMMERCIAL SPEECH

The United States Supreme Court has defined commercial
speech as any expression relating "solely to the economic interests of the speaker and its audience.,,36 Despite this ambiguous definition, the Court has consistently been able to recognize such speech. 37 The Court stated that there is really a

30. Moser, 811 F. Supp. at 542.
31. [d. The Oregon District Court granted plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary
injunction on December 18, 1992 - just two days before the TCPA was to become
effective. [d. at 546. See 47 U.S.C. § 227 (Supp. v 1993). The preliminary injunction enjoined the enforcement of the subsection until its constitutionality could be
determined by the court. Moser, 811 F. Supp. at 545-46.
32. Moser, 826 F. Supp. at 367.
33. See id. at 366-67. Judge Redden cited congressional reports and a Roper
Organization survey which found that automated calls make up ''less than three
percent of the telemarketing calls received by Americans." [d.
34. [d.
35. Moser, 46 F.3d at 970.
36. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Servo Comm'n of New York,
447 U.S. 557, 561 (1980). See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976) (hereinafter "Virginia Pharmacy")
(defining commercial speech as any communication which "proposes a commercial
transaction").
37. See, e.g., Ohralik V. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 455-56 (1978)
(defining attorney advertising as commercial speech subject to State Bar regulation); Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 562-63 (defining public utility advertising as
commercial speech); Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 762 (defining prescription drug

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1996

5

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 26, Iss. 1 [1996], Art. 11

158

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 26:153

"common-sense" distinction between speech "proposing a commercial transaction, which occurs in an area traditionally subject to government regulation, and other varieties of speech. ,,38
Courts have routinely held that commercial speech deserves
some constitutional protection, but not to the levels warranted
by political or non-commercial speech. 39 If a communication
advertises a product or service for profit or for a business purpose, it constitutes commercial speech and is entitled to limited
protection. 40
Fax advertising and automated telemarketing often disseminate commercial information for business purposes. 41
Such sales methods typically promote products and encourage
consumers to purchase goods or services. 42 The First Amendment protects these types of commercial speech, subject to
limited governmental regulation. 43
B. THE EVOLUTION OF COMMERCIAL SPEECH PROTECTION

1. The Traditional Approach
The First Amendment prohibits Congress from abridging
an individual's right to speak freely.44 Until recently, however, commercial speech was excluded from constitutional protection. 45 The Supreme Court first articulated this traditional
rule in Valentine v. Chrestensen,46 where an entrepreneur
challenged a state law prohibiting public dissemination of

advertising as commercial speech).
38. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 455·56.
39. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563. ("The Constitution therefore accords a
lesser protection to commercial speech than to other constitutionally guaranteed
expression."). See, e.g., Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 456·57; Board of Trustees of the State
Univ. of New York v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469 (1989); Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. 748.
40. See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 562·63.
41. See S. REP. No. 178, 102d Cong., 1st. Sess. 2·3 (1991), reprinted in 1991
U.S.C.C.A.N. (105 Stat. 2395) 1968, 1970. See also H.R. REP. No. 317, 102d Cong.,
1st Sess. at 13·14 (1991), available in 1991 WL 245201. A call must "encourage a
commercial transaction" to be subject to the TCPA. [d.
42. [d. at 13.
43. See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. 563. See also 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1971.
44. See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
45. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 761·62.
46. Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
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advertising leaflets.47 The Court held that, although the leaflets constituted "commercial speech," their distribution was a
privilege which the government could "appropriately regulate ... in the public interest."4s
This view changed, however, when the Supreme Court
adopted a rule granting constitutional protection to commercial
speech.49 The Court held that "purely commercial speech,"
such as prescription advertising, deserves some limited First
Amendment protection. 50 The Court reasoned that the speech
should be protected since consumers have a strong interest in
the free flow of lawful and accurate commercial information. 51
2. The Central Hudson Test
In the next decade, courts grappled with the limits of commercial speech protection. 52 Then, in Central Hudson Gas &
Elec. Corp. v. Public Servo Comm'n,53 the Supreme Court articulated a four-part test to determine whether a commercial
speech regulation violates the First Amendment. 54
In Central Hudson, a power company challenged a New
York state statute banning all promotional advertising by

47.Id.
48. Id. at 54.
49. See Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. 748. A pharmacy association challenged a
state statute prohibiting the advertisement of prescription drug prices. Id. at 74950. The state pharmacy board claimed that the statute protected professional standards of the pharmacy trade. See id. at 751-52. The Court declared the law unconstitutional, however, determining that "commercial advertising of the kind at issue"
deserves some First Amendment protection. Id. at 779 (Stewart, J., concurring).
50. Id. at 771, n.24 (citing Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relations Comm'n,
413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973». The Supreme Court asserted that a state may not completely "inhibit the dissemination of concededly truthful information about lawful
activity." Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771.
51. See Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771-72.
52. See, e.g., Linmark Assoc., Inc. v. Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977) (invalidating town restriction on residential "For Sale" signs); Bates v. State Bar of Az., 433
U.S. 350 (1977) (overturning state restriction on legal advertising in newspapers);
Ohralik, 436 U.S. 447 (1978) (upholding state restriction on commercial speech
relating to illegal activity).
53. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 557.
54. 1d. at 556.
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public utilities. 55 To determine the constitutionality of the
commercial speech restriction, the Supreme Court applied four
criteria: 1) the speech must not be misleading or concern unlawful activity, 2) the restriction must serve a substantial
government interest, 3) the restriction must directly advance
that government interest, and 4) the regulation must not be
more extensive than necessary to advance the government
interest. 56
The Court determined that the utility advertisement in
question was not misleading. 57 It also concluded that the regulation directly advanced a substantial government interest in
conserving electricity.58 However, since the regulation banned
all electricity advertising, the Court found it was more extensive than necessary.59 Accordingly, the Court struck it down
since the law failed the final portion of the four-part Central
Hudson test. 60
The Supreme Court has held that when a commercial
speech restriction is constitutionally challenged, it must withstand this Central Hudson "intermediate" level of scrutiny to
be upheld. 61 Courts examine such restrictions using a higher
presumption of invalidity than the rational basis review used
to test regulations of unprotected or misleading speech.62 Calling this review mid-level scrutiny, courts apply a less stringent

55. Id. at 558-59.
56. Id. at 566.
57. Id. at 567-68.
58. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 568-69. Utility advertising encourages consumers to use electricity, directly opposing the substantial government interest to
conserve power. Id.
59. Id. at 570-71.
60. Id.
61. See Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761 (1993) (State ban on "direct, in-person,
uninvited solicitation" by accountants is an unconstitutional restriction on commercial speech); See also Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 2371 (1995)
(Court upheld state law prohibiting lawyer solicitation of accident victims until 30
days after accident.). Both cases applied the Central Hudson "intermediate" standard of review to test the corresponding commercial speech restrictions. Id. See
Edenfield, 507 U.S. 761.
62. See Florida Bar, 115 S. Ct. at 2380. See also Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S.
at 761-62 (Commercial speech is entitled to some protection since it serves the
economic interests of the speaker and helps disseminate useful information.).
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test than the strict scrutiny used to examine protected speech
regulations. 63
3. The Modern Commercial Speech Doctrine
Since establishing the test for commercial speech in Central Hudson, the Supreme Court has relaxed the "no more
extensive than necessary" requirement. 64 Mter closely examining the meaning of "necessary" in the test's fourth prong,65
the Court determined that this term actually demands "something short of a least-restrictive-means standard."66 Rather,
the Court requires only a "reasonable fit," or a "means narrowly tailored to achieve the desired objective."67 As a result,
courts now tolerate some degree of flexibility between the
government's interest and the means chosen to accomplish that
end. 68
More recently, in City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network,
Inc., the Supreme Court further clarified the fourth element of
the commercial speech test. 69 Applying a more lenient standard than the earlier "least-restrictive-means" requirement,
the Court held that a commercial speech regulation need not
be "absolutely the least severe [means] that will achieve the
desired end.,,70 However, the Court added that the presence of
"numerous and obvious less burdensome alternatives" was

63. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 562·63 (citing Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 456) ("The
Constitution therefore accords lesser protection to commercial speech than to other
constitutionally guaranteed expression.").
64. Board of Trustees of the State Univ. of New York v Fox, 492 U.S. 469,
472, 480 (University policy prohibiting on-campus commercial solicitations, including "Tupperware parties," need only be narrowly tailored to achieve a desired
objective.).
65. See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
66. Fox, 492 U.S. at 476-77. The Court cited to McCulloch v. Maryland, 17
U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819), which interpreted the term "necessary." In McCulloch,
the Marshall Court determined that "necessary" in the Necessary and Proper
Clause (U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8) did not mean "absolutely necessary" or "indispensable." See id. at 413. The Supreme Court in Fox agreed that the expression is
sometimes used "loosely." Fox, 492 U.S. at 477.
67. [d. at 480.
68. See id. at 476-77.
69. City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 416-17 nn.1213 (1993).
70. [d.
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relevant in analyzing the facts for a reasonable fit.71 Only one
month after the Discovery Network decision, the Court interpreted the fourth prong further: a restriction "need only be
tailored in a reasonable manner to serve a substantial state
interest in order to survive First Amendment scrutiny.,,72
C. THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT

Although interstate commercial speech regulation became
less restrictive following Virginia Pharmacy and Central Hudson, states continued to regulate this speech.73 By 1991, more
than forty states and the District of Columbia had restricted or
banned unsolicited automated calls and faxes within their
boundaries. 74 However, because states are constitutionally
prohibited from restricting interstate commerce, state legislatures have no authority to enact laws which could curb advertising originating out-of-state. 75 In response, states lobbied
heavily for federal legislation to regulate these communications
across state lines. 76
In 1991, Congress responded to the states by holding extensive hearings regarding interstate communication regulations. 77 Lawmakers determined that automated telemarketing
calls constitute "an unwarranted intrusion upon privacy" and
that unsolicited faxes unfairly shift advertising costs to the
consumer. 78 Additionally, Congress concluded that "junk"

71. [d.

72. Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 767.
73. 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1970.
74. 1d. Florida has attempted to regulate intrastate telemarketers by requiring
them to maintain databases of individuals who wish to be excluded from
telemarketing activities. See H.R. REP. NO. 317, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. at 9 (1991).
Connecticut and Maryland have also enacted laws which prohibit the use of facsimile machines to disseminate unsolicited advertising within their state boundaries. In 1991, similar bills were pending in over half the states. 1d. at 26.
75. 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1973. See Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340
U.S. 349, 356 (1951) (The mere existence of the federal commerce power restricts
the states from discriminating against or unduly burdening interstate commerce.).
See generally U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9.
76. 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1970.
77. See generally 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1968.
78. Hearing Before House Subcommittee on Telecommunications and Finance,
102d Cong., 1st. Sess. 3-4 (1991). See H.R. REP. NO. 317, 102d Cong., 1st Sess.
25-26 (1991).
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faxes engage machines for hours and can "thwart the receipt of
legitimate and important messages.,,79 In response, the House
Subcommittee on Telecommunications and Finance determined
that these communications pose a threat to privacy and should
be curtailed by federal statute. so
On December 20, 1991, Congress passed the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act which amended Title II of the Communications Act of 1934. SI The TCPA, effective one year after
its enactment, specifically prohibits sending unsolicited fax
advertising or placing unauthorized automated calls. s2 Congress assigned the implementation and enforcement of all
TCPA provisions to the F.C.C. s3
IV. COURT'S ANALYSIS
A. DESTINATION VENTURES, LTD.

v.

F. C. C.

In Destination Ventures, the Ninth Circuit stated that
constitutional issues are reviewed de novo. 84 Accordingly, the
court reconsidered all evidence and arguments submitted by
the parties. s5 The court applied the commercial speech test
developed by the United States Supreme Court in Central
Hudson and its progeny: "[R]egulation of commercial speech
must directly advance a substantial government interest in a
manner that forms a "reasonable fit" with the interest."s6 The
court stressed that the government has the burden to "demonstrate the reasonable fit" with more than "speculation or con-

79. Id. The term "junk fax" refers to any fax received without the party's
prior, expressed consent. Id.
80. Id.
81. 47 U.S.C. § 227 (Supp. V 1993).
82. Id. at § 227(b)(1). Subsections (b)(3) and (c)(5) also permit a private individual to sue the caller. Under these provisions, for each TCPA violation, a plaintiff is entitled to injunctive relief plus damages (actual monetary losses or $500
per violation, whichever is greater). Id. at § 227(b)(3) and (c)(5). There is also a
provision allowing for treble damages if the defendant is shown to have acted
willfully or with knowledge of the prohibition. Id. at § 227(b)(3).
83. Id. at § 227(b)(2).
84. Destination Ventures, Ltd. v. F.C.C., 46 F.3d 54, 55 (9th Cir. 1995).
85. Id.
86. Id. (citing Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Servo Comm'n of
New York, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980); Board of Trustees of the State Univ. of New
York v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989».
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jecture."87 In Destination Ventures, the court examined the
governmental desire to prevent advertising cost-shifting in
light of the First Amendment and upheld the TCPA as constitutional. 88
1. Substantial Government Interest
In its decision, the Oregon district court held that the
government has a substantial interest in protecting consumers
from bearing the expense and inconvenience of fax advertising. 89 The district court found that this interest stems from
the general congressional objective to protect individuals from
economic harm. 90
On appeal, Destination Ventures conceded that the government has a substantial interest in preventing advertising costs
from being shifted to consumers.9l Instead, it argued that the
costs associated with fax transmissions were too minimal to
justify regulation. 92 Destination Ventures claimed that Congress had unconstitutionally "singled out" fax advertising for
regulation. 93 Further, it argued that the TCPA provision
should be struck down since the F.C.C. had not sustained its
burden of demonstrating a "reasonable fit" between the ban
and a government goal. 94 However, the Ninth Circuit upheld
the district court's decision that the costs shifted to consumers
were substantial enough to warrant government regulation. 95
87. Destination Ventures, 46 F.3d at 55-56. The government must show that
the hanns it seeks to curb are real and that the restriction "will in fact alleviate
them to a material degree." Id. at 56.
88. Id. at 54. The preliminary requirement of the Central Hudson and Fox
commercial speech test is that the communication not be misleading or relate to
unlawful activities. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564. Although the Ninth Circuit
did not seem to directly address this element in its analysis, it must have determined the faxes were not misleading since it proceeded with the other steps of the
Central Hudson test. See Destination Ventures, 46 F.3d at 54.
89. Destination Ventures, Ltd. v. F.C.C., 844 F. Supp. 632, 637 (D. Or. 1994).
90.Id.
91. Destination Ventures, 46 F.3d at 56.
92. See id. Destination Ventures argued that fax paper typically costs about
2.5¢ per page, countering the F.C.C.'s estimate of 35¢ to 40¢ per page. Id. Both
parties agreed that a single sheet transmission occupies a fax machine for between
30 and 40 seconds. Id.
93. [d.

94. Destination Ventures, 46 F.3d at 56.
95. See id. The district court previously determined that "unsolicited and un-
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2. Reasonable Fit
In defending a statute's constitutionality with regard to
free speech, the government must demonstrate that the federal
regulation is reasonably fitted to serve a substantial government interest. 96 This fit must be supported by more than
"mere speculation and conjecture.,,97 Destination Ventures
argued that the government failed to meet its burden since it
had not shown that unsolicited commercial faxes are more
expensive than junk, prank, or political messages delivered by
fax. 98 However, the Ninth Circuit held that the ban on fax
advertising was reasonably fitted to advance the government
goal of preventing cost-shifting because "unsolicited commercial fax solicitations are responsible for the bulk of advertising
cost-shifting.,,99
The court also determined that the ban even-handedly
applies to commercial solicitations sent by any organization. loo As a result, it did not engage in any statutory overbreadth or underinclusive analysis. lol
While finding this "reasonable fit" between the TCPA
provision and the government interest, the Ninth Circuit distinguished a similar case involving the distribution of commercial handbills on public property.102 In City of Cincinnati v.

wanted faxes can tie up a machine for hours and thwart the receipt of legitimate
and important messages." Destination Ventures, 844 F. Supp. at 636.
96. Fox, 492 U.S. at 480.
97. Destination Ventures, 46 F.3d at 55.
98. [d. at 56.
99. [d. The Ninth Circuit implicitly affirmed that the TCPA subsection advances a significant government interest in a "direct and material" way as required by
the Central Hudson test. See Destination Ventures, 46 F.3d at 55. See also Destination Ventures, 844 F. Supp. at 637. The court recognized that, in order to be
constitutional, a restriction must "in fact alleviate [a harm] to a material degree."
Destination Ventures, 46 F.3d at 55 (citing Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 767). It also
analyzed the other Central Hudson elements and upheld the provision, suggesting
that the "direct advancement" requirement had been satisfied. [d.
100. Destination Ventures, 46 F.3d at 56. The Ninth Circuit held .that the TCPA
provision pertained to all commercial fax advertisements, whether by "a multinational corporation or the Girl Scouts." [d.
101. [d.
102. [d. See City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 416-17
(1993) (The Supreme Court applied the Central Hudson·Fox four-part test to a city

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1996

13

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 26, Iss. 1 [1996], Art. 11

166

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 26:153

Discovery Network, Inc., the Supreme Court struck down a city
ordinance which banned handbill news racks but preserved
sidewalk newspaper stands. l03 Although the city claimed its
law reduced littering and enhanced sidewalk safety, the Court
failed to find a reasonable fit since the ordinance only regulated a small part of the hann. l04
Unlike handbill racks which plausibly increase littering,
the fax advertising costs sought to be curbed in Destination
Ventures accounted for a substantial percentage of all consumer cost-shifting. lOS The TCPA bans all unsolicited fax advertising and greatly reduces the majority of cost-shifting to consumers. l06 Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit held that Congress
could enact the TCPA to reduce the volume of intrusive calls
even though their regulation would not completely abolish costshifting. 107
The Ninth Circuit detennined that a complete ban reasonably fit the government's interest. 108 This finding, coupled
with the ban's evenhanded application, convinced the court
that prohibiting unsolicited commercial faxes, regardless of
their source, is a reasonable means of achieving the Congressional goal of protecting the public from cost-shifting.109

ordinance restricting certain newspaper stands, but failed to find a "reasonable
fit.").
103. [d. at 412; Discovery Network, 507 U.S. at 416-17.
104. [d. The Supreme Court found no "reasonable fit" between the government
interest in promoting safety & aesthetics and the ordinance because the "benefit to
be derived from the removal of 62 news racks while about 1,500-2,000 remain in
place" was "minute ... and paltry." [d.
105. See H.R. REP. NO. 317, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1991), available in 1991
WL 24520l.
106. Destination Ventures, 46 F.3d at 55. See 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(C) (Supp. V
1993).
107. See Destination Ventures, 46 F.3d at 56. See also United States v. Edge
Broadcasting, 113 S. Ct. 2696 (1993).
108. Destination Ventures, 46 F.3d at 56.
109. [d.
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3. Data on Cost-Shifting
Destination Ventures argued that the TCPA ban was excessive. 110 It admitted that fax advertising shifts costs to the
consumer, but claimed these costs had been significantly reduced by technology and were now de minimis. 111 Both parties used expert opinions and news articles to estimate the
actual costs and burdens associated with fax transmissions. 112
The court refused to consider statistics to establish these
costs, asserting that the district court had already given due
weight to the parties' arguments. 113 The court held that Destination Ventures could have challenged these "material facts"
on appeal, but had waived this ability by not providing the
F.C.C. with "reasonable notice that the sufficiency of its claim
[would] be in issue .... "114 The Ninth Circuit refused to hear
new factual data from either party and relied on the district
court holding that the fax advertising cost-shifting was sufficient to justify federal regulation. 115 Thus, the court held that
the TCPA provision banning unsolicited fax advertising did not
violate the First Amendment. 116

110. [d.
111. [d.
112. [d. at 55-56. The parties agreed that a typical fax "ties up" a machine for

between 30 to 45 seconds, but disagreed as to the cost of each transmission. [d. at
56.
113. Destination Ventures, 46 F.3d at 56. See Duggan v. International Ass'n of
Machinists, 510 F.2d 1086, 1087 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1012 (1975)
(Flight engineer suing labor union was not entitled to extensive appellate review
after the trial court had correctly dismissed the case on its merits.).
114. [d. See Buckingham v. United States, 998 F.2d 735, 742 (9th Cir. 1993)
(defining reasonable notice as "adequate time to develop the facts on which the
litigant will depend to oppose summary judgment").
115. Destination Ventures, 46 F.3d at 56.
116. [d. at 55-56.
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MOSER V. F.C.C.

1. Classifying the Provision's Content
In Moser,117 the district court determined that the TCPA
provision restricting automated telemarketing calls involved
the regulation of commercial speech. us It then applied the
Central Hudson and Fox tests to determine the constitutionality of the statute. U9 The Ninth Circuit, however, determined
that the TCPA subsection was actually a content-neutral regulation since the statute regulates both commercial and noncommercial telemarketing calls. 120 As a result, the Ninth Circuit applied a different test of constitutionality than the district court. 121
2. The Ward Test as Applied to TCPA Subsection (b)(l)(B)
The Ninth Circuit explained that, under Ward v. Rock
Against Racism,122 for a government restriction on the time,
place, and manner of content-neutral speech to be constitutional, the regulation must be: (1) narrowly tailored to advance a
significant government interest, (2) adequately justified without reference to the content of the speech, and (3) must leave
open alternate channels for communication of the information. 123 The Ninth Circuit noted that the constitutional tests

117. Moser v. F.C.C., 811 F. Supp 541 (D. Or. 1992) (granting preliminary injunction).
118. [d. at 543. The district court determined that 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(B) is a
"content-based regulation" since it draws distinctions between recorded and live
speech and distinguishes between commercial and non-commercial messages. Moser
v. F.C.C., 826 F. Supp. 360, 363. (D. Or. 1993). Citing Discovery Network, the
district court determined the constitutionality of the provision should be examined
using the Central Hudson and Fox commercial speech tests. [d. at 364.
119. [d. at 363-64.
120. Moser v. F.C.C., 46 F.3d 970, 973 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct.
2615 (1995). The Ninth Circuit found that "since nothing in the statute requires
the Commission to distinguish between commercial and non-commercial speech . . .
[it] should be analyzed as a content-neutral time, place, or manner restriction." [d.
121. See id. See also Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989) (outlining constitutional test for content-neutral speech).
122. [d.
123. Moser, 46 F.3d at 973. See Ward, 491 U.S. at 791. The Court upheld a
New York City law requiring rock performers in public parks to use city provided
sound equipment and technicians in an effort to reduce concert noise. [d. at 787.
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for restrictions on content-neutral time, place, and manner
speech and commercial speech are "essentially identical. "124

a. Narrowly Tailored to Serve a Significant Government
Interest
The Ninth Circuit agreed with Congress that protecting
residential privacy from automated telemarketing calls is a
substantial government interest. 125 The court referred to congressional findings that such calls constituted an "invasion of
privacy" and that consumers favored their regulation. 126 The
Ninth Circuit reversed the district court and determined that
the TCPA restriction was "narrowly tailored" to serve this
significant government interest. 127 In upholding the provision, the Ninth Circuit relied on recent Supreme Court decisions holding that proper commercial speech regulations must
be narrowly tailored, but need not be the least restrictive
means available. 128
b. Adequately Justified Without Reference to Content

The plaintiff in Moser argued that no justification for the
TCPA ban on automated, commercial calls exists since such
calls are no more intrusive than "live" or non-commercial
ones. 129 However, the Ninth Circuit adopted the findings of

The Court sustained the law as a valid time, place, or manner restriction even
though less-restrictive means existed to keep sounds low. [d. at 802-03.
124. Moser, 46 F.3d at 973 (citing Fox, 492 U.S. at 477).
125. See id. at 974. See also Moser, 826 F. Supp. at 362 ("[TJhe government's
interest in promoting residential privacy . . . is substantial.").
126. [d. See S. REP. NO. 178, 102d Cong., 1st. Sess. 2-3 (1991), reprinted in
1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. (l05 Stat. 2395) 1968, 1969, 1972-73.
127. Moser, 46 F.3d at 975. The district court previously determined that the
ban was not "reasonably fitted" to advance the government interest given the
ban's slight benefit, the narrow distinction between automated calls and other
types of telephonic solicitations, and the government's disregard for less burdensome alternatives. Moser, 826 F. Supp. at 365. However, the Ninth Circuit disagreed. See Moser, 46 F.3d at 974.
128. [d. at 973-74. See, e.g., Discovery Network, 507 U.S. 410; Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984).
129. Moser, 46 F.3d at 974. In the district court, Moser argued that the ban
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congressional hearings which identified automated
telemarketing as a residential privacy threat. 130 The court
gave deference to the conclusions since Congress is ''better
equipped [than the court] to amass and evaluate the vast
amounts of data bearing on such an issue.,,131 Accordingly,
the court held that congressional and public concerns surrounding residential privacy justified the narrowly tailored
TCPA ban on automated, commercial calls. 132
The Ninth Circuit court also determined that the regulation does not violate the constitution since it does not favor a
particular viewpoint. 133 The court explained that such
underinclusive speech regulation is acceptable so long as it
does not give "one side of a debatable question an advantage in
expressing its views to the people.,,134 Consequently, it held
that the ban on automated, prerecorded calls did not seek to
"favor a particular viewpoint" and was within acceptable constitutional limits on free speech. 135
The court emphasized that the government is not required
to "make progress on every front before it can make progress
on any front."136 Thus, the harm sought to be curtailed by the
government need only be substantially reduced, not totally
eliminated. 137 For example, the government could sufficiently
reduce the harm of telemarketing by regulating only automat-

would not significantly advance the government interest since automated calls
represent only a fraction of all telemarketing calls. Moser, 826 F. Supp. at 367.
The district court agreed with Moser's position, relying on the ban's "slight" benefit to find no "reasonable fit." [d.
130. Moser, 46 F.3d at 974. The court referred to the findings of Senate Report
No. 102-178. [d. See 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1970.
131. Moser, 46 F.3d at 974 (citing Walters v. National Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 330-31 n.12 (1985)). The Ninth Circuit noted that reliance on
the reports would not "foreclose the court's independent judgment." [d.
132. See id. at 974-75. The Ninth Circuit held the TCPA provision to be content-neutral since "nothing in the statute requires the Commission to distinguish
between commercial and non-commercial speech." [d. at 973.
133. [d. at 974.
134. [d. (quoting City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 114 S. Ct. 2038, 2043 (1994) (an
"underinc1usive" speech regulation is only unconstitutional if it gives a particular
group an advantage in expressing its views».
135. Moser, 46 F.3d at 974.
136. See id. (quoting Edge Broadcasting, 113 S. Ct. at 2707).
137. [d.

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol26/iss1/11

18

McConathy: Telephone Consumer Protection Act

1996]

TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT

171

ed telemarketing, without banning all phone solicitations. 13s
Therefore, the TCPA can constitutionally restrict only automated calls while still exempting "live," non-commercial, or
operator introduced ones from regulation. 139

c. Alternative Channels Available

The Ninth Circuit determined that the TCPA properly
excluded alternative channels of communication from regulation, including taped messages, operator introduced recorded
calls, and direct "live" solicitations. 14O The court held that although automated solicitations are the least expensive and
most efficient method of telemarketing, they could still be
restricted by Congress. 141
The Ninth Circuit held that the TCPA provision did not
violate the First Amendment since Congress narrowly tailored
the Act to promote residential privacy and preserved unregulated alternative methods of disseminating this information. 142

138. Moser, 46 F.3d at 975.
139. See id. at 974-75.
140. See id. The TCPA regulates calls placed by an automated dialing system,
using an artificial or prerecorded voice, or unsolicited advertisements sent by fax
or computer. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1) (Supp. V 1993). See also 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1968 (The primary focus of the TCPA is to "protect the public from automated
telephone calls.").
141. Moser, 46 F.3d at 975. See Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 88-89 (1949)
(The Court upheld a city ban on sound trucks based on the municipal desire to
protect "quiet and tranquility." The Court reasoned that although "more people
may be easily reached by sound trucks ... [this] is not enough to call forth constitutional protection for what those charged with public welfare reasonably think
is a nuisance when easy means of publicity are open.").
142. Moser, 46 F.3d at 975. On appeal, the F.C.C. also challenged the district
court's jurisdiction over the case, arguing that the Court of Appeals has exclusive
jurisdiction over F.C.C. regulatory challenges. [d. at 973 (referring to 47 U.S.C. §
402(a) (Supp. V 1993)). The Ninth Circuit declined to grant exclusive jurisdiction.
[d. The court reasoned that since the TCPA provision was part of the initial statute and not a subsequent F.C.C. regulation, the district court had initial federal
question jurisdiction. [d.
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V. CRITIQUE
In both Destination Ventures l43 and Moser,l44 the same
unanimous three judge panel upheld TCPA provisions restricting automated telemarketing and unsolicited fax advertising.
These decisions are consistent with the Constitution and with
Congress' articulated desire to reform telemarketing and avoid
advertising cost-shifting. 145 However, in deciding these cases,
the Ninth Circuit failed to thoroughly address valid arguments
offered by both plaintiffs. 146
A. No "REASONABLE FIT" IN DESTINATION VENTURES

In Destination Ventures, the Ninth Circuit applied the
Central Hudson test for constitutional commercial speech and
held that the TCPA fax restriction "reasonably fit" the substantial government interest of preventing cost-shifting.147 However, the opinion failed to fully analyze plaintiff's argument
that a complete ban of all unsolicited faxes is more extensive
than necessary. 148
The Supreme Court interpreted Central Hudson to require
less than a perfect fit, but at least a reasonable fit "between
the legislature's ends and the means chosen to accomplish
those ends.'1149 The Court also held that the existence of "numerous and obvious less-burdensome alternatives" is relevant
in analyzing a commercial speech restriction. 150
Destination Ventures argued that many other less-burden-

143. Destination Ventures, Ltd. v. F.C.C., 46 F.3d 54 (9th Cir. 1995).
144. Moser v. F.C.C., 46 F.3d 970 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct.
(1995).
145. See S. REP. NO. 178, 102d Cong., 1st. Sess. 2-3 (1991), reprinted in
U.S.C.C.A.N. (105 Stat. 2395) 1968, 1969-70. See also H.R. REp. NO. 317,
Cong., 1st Sess. at 13-14 (1991), available in 1991 WL 245201.
146. See Destination Ventures, 46 F.3d 54; Moser, 46 F.3d at 970.
147. Destination Ventures, 46 F.3d at 55, 57.
148. See id.
149. Board of Trustees of the State Univ. of New York v. Fox, 492 U.S.
480 (1989).
150. City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 417
(1993).
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some alternatives to a total ban on unsolicited fax advertising
exist, including: using "do-not-fax" lists, regulating the hours of
fax advertising, and limiting the frequency of transmissions. 15l The district court held that these alternatives failed
to establish that Congress had improperly tailored the TCPA
to prevent cost-shifting.152
The Ninth Circuit opinion offered no discussion regarding
other methods to reduce fax advertising costS.153 Nevertheless, plaintiffs proposed techniques, and others such as the use
of a toll-free number to request reimbursement or a similar
"hotline" to permit fax owners to be excluded from future
transmissions, might have proved less restrictive. l54 Because
less-burdensome alternatives would have been relevant, the
court should have considered whether any means other than a
complete ban would have advanced the governmental interest
"in a manner less intrusive to [plaintiffs] First Amendment
rights. ,,155
B. No SIGNIFICANT HARM

In Moser, plaintiffs argued that the TCPA's content-neutral ban on automated telemarketing calls was underinclusive
since it excluded all other types of telemarketing from regulation. ls6 However, the Ninth Circuit held that since "the ban
on automated, prerecorded calls [was] not an attempt to favor
a particular viewpoint," it was constitutional. 157
Nearly 70 percent of the American public regard calls from

151. See Destination Ventures, Ltd. v. F.C.C., 844 F. Supp. 632, 639 (D. Or.
1994). See also Daniel Brenner, Federal Court Decision: a Roadblock to Advertising
on the Information Highway?, 5 WASHINGTON LEGAL FOUNDATION (LEGAL OPINION
LETTER) NO. 12 (June 9, 1995) (hereinafter "BRENNER").
152. Destination Ventures, 844 F. Supp. at 639.
153. Destination Ventures, 46 F.3d at 54.
154. See BRENNER, supra note 151 and accompanying text.
155. Id. See Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 115 S. Ct. 1585, 1593-94 (1995). The
court struck down a federal law prohibiting the display of alcohol content percentages on beer labels. In its analysis, the Court examined alternatives to the ban
such as directly limiting alcohol content, prohibiting marketing efforts of high
alcohol products, and limiting the ban to only certain types of beer. Id. at 1593.
156. See Moser, 46 F.3d at 974. See 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(B) (Supp. V 1993).
157. Moser, 46 F.3d at 974-75.
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automated telemarketers as "annoying" and an intrusion into
the home. l58 Yet, automated solicitations make up "less than
three percent of all telemarketing calls received by Americans.,,159 As the Oregon district court determined, the TCPA
ban on automated calls would eliminate only a very small
percentage of the millions of sales calls made each day.l60
In Discovery Network, the Supreme Court held that the
prohibition of only a small number of newsracks did not reasonably fit the advancement of the state's interest in preventing littering. 161 However, in Moser, the Ninth Circuit upheld
the TCPA ban on automated sales calls, even though these
calls made up only a small percentage of all telemarketing. 162
As the Supreme Court noted, ''bright lines that clearly
cabin commercial speech in a distinct category" are difficult to
draw. 163 However, in this case, it appears that prohibiting automated calls, which constitute only part of the total harm
caused by telemarketing, is underinclusive. l64 Under its test
for content-neutral speech, the Ninth Circuit should have more
closely examined whether automated telemarketing actually
constitutes a significant harm which justifies regulation. 165
C. DIMINISHING FAX COSTS

In Destination Ventures, plaintiffs argued that the costshifting resulting from fax advertising had become very small
due to modern technological advances. 166 However, the Ninth

158. Moser, 826 F. Supp. at 366 (referring to a Roper Organization survey). See
1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1972 ("[AJrtificial or prerecorded voice messages are more of
a nuisance and a greater invasion of privacy than calls placed by 'live' persons.").
159. Moser, 826 F. Supp. at 366-67.
160. [d. at 367.
161. See Discovery Network, 507 U.S. at 425-26; supra notes 102-04 and accompanying text. The challenged regulation banned 62 racks, accounting for only about
3-4% of all racks in the city. [d. at 1510.
162. Moser, 46 F.3d at 974-75.
163. Discovery Network, 507 U.S. at 419.
164. See generally Moser, 46 F.3d at 973-75.
165. [d. See, e.g., supra note 122-23 and accompanying text (outlining three part
constitutionality test for content-neutral commercial speech regulations).
166. See Destination Ventures, 46 F.3d at 56. On appeal, both Destination Ventures and the F.C.C. introduced declarations estimating the costs of a typical fax.
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Circuit chose to examine the harm caused by unsolicited faxes
"as it existed when Congress enacted the [TCPA], rather than
speculate upon what solutions may turn up in the future."167
The court, relying on 1991 congressional findings, concluded
that unwanted faxes cause cost-shifting and inconvenience
sufficient to warrant their regulation. 168
Although courts often give deference to legislative conclusions, such findings do not foreclose the court's independent
judgment. 169 The Supreme Court held that "reliance on legislative history is hazardous at best.'ll7O Accordingly, the Ninth
Circuit may have given too much weight to the outdated findings of Congress regarding the TCPA. 171
Since the Act's enactment in December 1991, advances in
technology have nearly eliminated the costs and inconvenience
of unsolicited faxes. 172 Although an advertiser may not impose its costs upon the consumer, it appears that inconvenience or de minimis cost shifting is acceptable under the Constitution. 173 The court should have considered this movement
towards nominal cost faxing further before categorizing facsim-

[d.
167. [d. at 57. "[T]he possibility of future technological advances allowing simultaneous transmissions and eliminating the need for paper does not alter this conclusion." [d.
168. See id.; Destination Ventures, 844 F. Supp. at 636-37. See also Walters v.
National Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 331 n.12 (1985) (Congress is
"better equipped to amass and evaluate the vast amounts of data bearing on such
issue[s)."); Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 72-73, 83 (1985) (Court upheld maleonly military draft after deferring to prior Congressional findings.).
169. See Sable Communications v. F.C.C., 492 U.S. 115, 129 (1989). See also
Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 843 (1978) ("Deference
to a legislative finding cannot limit judicial inquiry when First Amendment rights
are at stake.").
170. Board of Educ. of Westside Community Sch. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 242
(1990).
171. See generally Destination Ventures, 46 F.3d at 55. See also 1991
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1968 (findings were published in November, 1991).
172. See infra notes 187-90 and accompanying text.
173. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prod. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 72 (1983). The Court
struck down a federal statute prohibiting the mailing of unsolicited advertisements
for contraceptives. The court held that a "short, though regular journey from the
mailbox to the trashcan . . . is an acceptable burden, at least as far as the Constitution is concerned." [d.
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ile advertising cost-shifting as a substantial interest the government should avoid. 174
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS
Currently, the TCPA does not preclude the transmission of
non-commercial faxes, such as political messages or prank
faxes, to unconsenting recipients. 175 In addition, the TCPA
does not regulate the transmission of commercial or non-commercial messages to unconsenting Internet users. 176 Like unsolicited fax advertising and automated telemarketing, these
unregulated categories also shift transmission costs and inconvenience to the consumer. 177
Pursuant to the TCPA, the F.C.C. can initiate rulemaking
proceedings and promulgate regulations to protect the privacy
rights of telephone subscribers in an "efficient, effective, and
economic manner."178 However, since its regulatory power is
limited by the language of the Act, the F.C.C. is powerless to
restrict these unarticulated channels of communication. 179
In both Destination Ventures and Moser, the Ninth Circuit
opted to follow outdated congressional findings and upheld
portions of the TCPA. 180 If the courts are going to examine
the TCPA's constitutionality based upon conditions existing at

174. See generally Destination Ventures, 46 F.3d at 57.
175. See generally Destination Ventures, Ltd. v. F.C.C., 46 F.3d at 54, 55 (9th
Cir. 1995). See also 47 U.S.C. § 227 (Supp. V 1993).
176. See 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(C) (Supp. V 1993). The statute only prohibits
using a "computer, or other device" to send an unwanted commercial message to a
fax machine. [d.
177. See generally Destination Ventures, 46 F.3d at 56. Plaintiffs argued that
both commercial and non-commercial faxes tie up machines equally and require
the recipient to pay ink and paper costs. [d.
178. See generally 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(1-2) (Supp. V 1993). "The Commission
shall . . . prescribe regulations to implement methods and procedures for protecting the privacy rights described . . . in an efficient, effective, and economic manner and without the imposition of any additional charges to telephone subscribers."
[d.

179. See id.
180. See Destination Ventures, 46 F.3d at 57; Moser v. F.C.C., 46 F.3d 970,
974-75 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2615 (1995).
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its enactment, then Congress should regularly amend the
TCPA to account for changing technology.l81

A. THE TCPA SHOULD BAN ALL UNSOLICITED FAXING
Currently, the TCPA prohibits unsolicited advertisements
sent from a facsimile machine or computer to another facsimile
machine. 182 Under this law, courts have assessed compensatory and punitive damages against defendants who illegally
transmit advertising in such a fashion. 183
However, the TCPA only restricts messages advertising
the commercial availability of products or services. l84 The
statute is silent regarding unsolicited non-commercial messages such as political propaganda, fund-raising appeals from nonprofit groups, prank faxes, vulgar cartoons, and other transmissions. 185 As the plaintiffs in Destination Ventures argued,
faxes which contain advertising are no more costly to the unwilling recipient than faxes containing non-commercial messages. l86 Unfortunately, because Congress considered only
faxes which solicit the sale of products or services during its
1991 TCPA hearings, the resulting statute regulates only commercial faxes. 187
Fax technology has steadily advanced since the TCPA's
enactment. l88 Modern fax machines and modems "brand"
each page of outgoing transmissions with the sender's name
and telephone number. 189 Additionally, faxes now can be

181. See Destination Ventures, 46 F.3d at 57.
182. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(C) (Supp. V 1993).
183. See Andrea Gerlin, Business Tired of Faxed Ads Sue the Senders, THE
WALL STREET JOURNAL, May 9, 1995, at B1. A group of Texas businesses sued 35
companies alleging that unwanted ads tie up fax machines, use ink & paper, constitute a nuisance, and invade their privacy. In 1994 alone, the F.C.C. received
over 300 official complaints from recipients of unwanted fax advertisements. Id.
184. See 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(C) and (a)(4).
185. Id.
186. See Destination Ventures, 46 F.3d at 56.
187. See H.R. REP. No. 317, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1991), available in 1991
WL 245201.
188. See Destination Ventures, 46 F.3d at 57.
189. Telephony, COMMUNICATIONS DAILY, Aug. 31, 1995, at 1. See 47 U.S.C. §
227(d)(2) (Supp. V 1993).
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transmitted and received completely by computer, allowing
users to preview and store messages prior to printout. 190
Some new machines even include an "anti-junk-mail feature"
to block incoming transmissions which do not originate from a
pre-entered list of phone numbers. 191
Despite these technological advances, complaints involving
unsolicited, non-commercial faxes continue to increase. 192
Since both commercial and non-commercial transmissions
harm an unwilling recipient equally, the TCPA should prohibit
all unsolicited faxes regardless of their content. 193 Any argument that such a broad ban would chill speech could be circumvented by revising the Act's definition of unsolicited advertisement to require the consent of the receiving party.194 To
comply with the Act, the sender could show express consent in
the form of direct authorization, or implied consent through
prior dealings or an existing business relationship.195
Such a modified provision would further reduce cost-shifting and would more easily withstand constitutional challenges
under the less stringent Ward test. 196 Presently, all the other
TCPA prohibitions are content-neutral. 197 Expanding the pro-

190. Andy Pargh, Some Facts About Fax Machines, THE STATE JOURNAL REGISTER (Springfield, Ill.), Aug. 4, 1995, at 4A. Such technology also pennits a user to
send and receive a fax simultaneously or to receive multiple incoming transmissions at once. Id.
191. Id.
192. See generally Andrea Gerlin, Business Tired of Faxed Ads Sue the Senders,
THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, May 9, 1995, at Bl.
193. Jim Doyle, Court Upholds Junk-Fax Ban, THE SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE,
Feb. 2, 1995, at A17.
194. See 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(4) (Supp. V 1993) (requiring the "prior express
invitation or permission" of the recipient).
195. See generally id. (Routine faxes between businesses or individuals would
still be protected since prior dealings could imply consent. Implied consent might
also be shown through business or professional relationships, or through prior acts
such as providing someone with the facsimile machine phone number.). See also
Daniel Brenner, Federal Court Decision: a Roadblock to Advertising on the Information Highway?, 5 WASHINGTON LEGAL FOUNDATION (LEGAL OPINION LETTER) NO.
12 (June 9, 1995).
196. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989).
197. See 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(l) (Supp. V 1993). The TCPA prohibits using an
automatic dialing system to deliver a message, regardless of its content. The law
similarly precludes sending unsolicited messages to residential phones or simultaneously engaging more than one phone line in a multi-line business system. Id.
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vision to proscribe unsolicited faxes regardless of their content
would give the courts an easier, more consistent test of constitutionality.
B. THE TCPA SHOULD RESTRICT UNSOLICITED ADVERTISING
ON THE INTERNET

Recently, advertisers have begun to exploit the
Internee98 by soliciting their products and services in a practice commonly known as "spamming.,,199 Some advertisers
send unsolicited electronic mail (hereinafter "e-mail") to individuals or large groups of user mailboxes. 2oo More frequently,
advertisers post sales messages in newsgroups, which are
Internet "sites" containing articles, messages, and e-mails
about a specific topic. 201 Spammers argue that these legitimate sales tactics are no different than telemarketing calls and
mass mailings. 202 However, considering the cost of on-line
time, information experts agree that the TCPA should be expanded to protect Internet users from receiving unsolicited
information. 203 As with faxes, Internet messages are inexpensive and easy to send. 204 They are also difficult for the typical
on-line user to avoid. 205 Individuals encountering junk e-mail
must sort through obscurely titled postings to ascertain the
value of each message. 206 Junk e-mail can be avoided through
198. See supra note 12.
199. See John Schwartz, It's the Spam You Read That's Making Many
Interneters Queasy, THE WASHINGTON POST, Nov. 20, 1995, at F17 (hereinafter
·SCHWARTZ"). See L. CANTER AND M. SIEGEL, How TO MAKE A FORTUNE ON THE
INFORMATION SUPERHIGHWAY: EVERYONE'S GUERILLA GUIDE TO MARKETING ON THE
INTERNET AND OTHER ON-LINE SERVICES (HarperCollins 1994).
200. See SCHWARTZ. One advertiser sent an e-mail advertisement to 171,000
people and listed a false return address. Small circulations are uncommon since
they are too difficult, expensive, and time consuming. Id.
201. Understand the Culture, THE MILWAUKEE JOURNAL, Aug. 14, 1994, at D3.
Over 8,000 newsgroups exist on the Internet ranging from a bonsai aficionados
group to a Somalia discussion group. Id.
202. See SCHWARTZ.
203. See Kit R. Roane, Court Upholds Law Banning Unsolicited Fax Ads, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 24, 1995, at B6. See also Grant Parsons, And Now For a Word
From . .. , THE NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Mar. 30, 1995, at E1 (Unsolicited advertising on the Internet may soon be illegal because of cost-shifting to
subscribers if recent court decisions prohibiting unsolicited faxes are any guide.).
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. See id. See also Daniel Ansk, Postcard from Cyberspace, L.A. TIMES, Nov.
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prescreening or specialized software, but much like fax advertising and telemarketing, this shifts the cost and inconvenience
onto the unwilling consumer. 207 Although most servers do attempt to pre-screen commercial messages,208 advertisers are
increasingly finding their way into user mailboxes and discussion areas. As a result, consumer awareness and unrest toward
on-line advertising has grown considerably since 1994. 209
In response to this widespread consumer discontent, TCPA
subsection (b)(1)(C) should be expanded to restrict unsolicited
Internet advertising. 210 Presently, this provision prohibits
sending "unsolicited advertisements" by fax or computer, but
only to other facsimile machines.2l1 As a result, on-line advertising remains unregulated. 212 Congress should examine the

I, 1995, at 4 (Some users report receiving up to several hundred unsolicited ad
postings each day.).
207. See Junk Mail Threatens to Clog E-mail Boxes, SALT LAKE TRIBUNE, Aug.
14, 1995, at C3. Commercial and even free e-mail "filter" programs are available
to help users sift through unwanted mail. These programs automatically delete
messages which contain names, profanities, or other selected words. Id. See also
Tim Blangger, AM. Magazine Online, ALLENTOWN MORNING CALL, Aug. 8, 1995, at
Dl.

208. See Bruce V. Bigelow, Infuriated Client Sues Over Junk E-mail, SAN DIEGO
UNION-TRIBUNE, Feb. 19, 1995, at HI-2. CompuServe prohibits sending advertising
solicitations to its subscribers. However, some Internet servers, like Prodigy Services, Co., permit on-line advertising in an effort to defray subscription costs_ Users of these servers have already consented to such solicitations through prior
registration and consent forms. Id.
Server and individual newsgroup operators attempt to intercept incoming
unsolicited ads before they are delivered to the users. However, operators are not
on guard 24 hours a day, and ads frequently slip through. See generally Daniel
Akst, Postcard From Cyberspace, L.A. TIMES, Nov. I, 1995, at 4.
209. See Tim Blangger, AM. Magazine Online, ALLENTOWN MORNING CALL,
Aug. 8, 1995, at D1. In April, 1994, a husband/wife law firm transmitted a message advertising their immigration legal services to thousands of Internet users
worldwide. In response, so many recipients flooded their mail server with negative
messages that it malfunctioned. Following this now infamous incident, server administrators began creating more structured rules to define acceptable solicitations.
However, spamming is still viewed as an unacceptable Internet practice by most
users. Id. See Stephen McGookin, FT Review of Business Books, THE FINANCIAL
TIMES, Sept. 27, 1995. See also L. CANTER AND M. SIEGEL, How TO MAKE A FORTUNE ON THE INFORMATION SUPERHIGHWAY: EVERYONE'S GUERILLA GUIDE TO MARKETING ON THE INTERNET AND OTHER ON-LINE SERVICES (HarperCollins 1994).
210. See 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(C) (Supp. V 1993).
211. Id.
212. See id. Recent attempts to curtail other Internet infractions has had only a
limited effect. In November, 1995, the United States Department of Transportation
fined Virgin Airways for placing a misleading advertisement on the Internet. See
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prevalence and harms of unsolicited on-line messages, and
modify current TCPA statutory language to restrict this practice.213 The on-line costs to users caused by such messages
are real and can only be curbed through federal intervention. 214
By no means, however, should all forms of advertising be
banned from the Internet.215 Only advertising which is unsolicited or "pushed onto the consumer" should be restricted. 216
Many individuals enjoy browsing though "Internet malls" or
classified advertisement groups searching for possible purchases.217 However, access to this sort of information is completely under the user's control. 218 Like magazine advertisement
or junk mail, users can skim messages or ignore them completely.219 A slight modification in TCPA language would allow advertisement "links" or "sites" where information can be
also Rhonda Richards, Virgin Airways Fined $14,000 for 'Net Ad, USA TODAY,
Nov. 22, 1995, at B2. Other government agencies continue to seek ways to curb
on-line copyright, trademark and pornography infractions. [d.
213. See generally Moser v. F.C.C., 46 F.3d 970, 974-75 (9th Cir. 1995), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 2615 (1995). Only through Congressional analysis can the threat
of unsolicited on-line messages be determined. If Congress finds that both commercial and non-commercial on-line messages equally injure the unwilling recipient,
then the current content based language of TCPA subsection (b)(1)(C) should be
amended. See supra notes 180-97 and related text.
214. See Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761 (1993). Internet users frequently communicate interstate, suggesting that Congress has the authority to enact such
legislation through its commerce power. See also 47 U.S.C. § 227(0(2) (Supp. V
1993).
215. See Stephen McGookin, FT Review of Business Books, THE FINANCIAL
TIMES, Sept. 27, 1995 (Some newsgroups are dedicated specifically for commercial
advertiSing and usually include the word "biz" in the newsgroup's name.). See also
Tim Blangger, A.M. Magazine Online, ALLENTOWN MORNING CALL, Aug. 8, 1995, at
Dl.
216. [d.
217. [d. See Grant Parsons, And Now For a Word From . .. , THE NEWS &
OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Mar. 30, 1995, at El. Many companies maintain on-line
"websites" where Internet users can access information about their products. Companies such as Pizza Hut and Federal Express currently operate such websites or
homepages where users can purchase goods and services on-line. [d.
218. See id. (Frequently, this is accomplished by choosing certain options or
"clicking" certain buttons on the computer screen to call up messages or other
information. ).
219. See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prod. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 72 (1983) (The Court
struck down a federal statute prohibiting the mailing of unsolicited advertisements
for contraceptives. The Court held that a "short, though regular, journey from the
mailbox to the trashcan . . . is an acceptable burden, at least as far as the Constitution is concerned.").
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"pulled off," but would restrict advertisers from using e-mail or
newsgroups to push their wares without prior consent. 220
New technological and communication advances emerge
each year. As a result, Congress must survey and evaluate the
communications field regularly to accommodate for new consumer threats. That way, the Internet and other communication avenues can continue to be regulated in an "efficient,
effective, and economic manner" to protect user privacy and
prevent advertising cost-shifting.221
VII. CONCLUSION
Although the Ninth Circuit properly upheld the TCPA in
both Destination Ventures and Moser, it failed to thoroughly
analyze these provisions under their corresponding commercial
speech tests. 222 The court was also unable to consider the
challenged statutory subsections in light of current technologies. 223 As a result, the court was forced to accept cost-shifting statistics and consumer opinion already four years out of
date. 224 Congress must amend and continually update the
TCPA so that federal courts may address constitutional challenges using current information.

Michael D. McConathy·

220. See 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(C) (Supp. V 1993).
221. [d. at § 227(c)(2) (Supp. V 1993) (describing how the F.C.C. should prescribe regulations and procedures under the TCPA).
222. See Destination Ventures, Ltd. v. F.C.C., 46 F.3d 54 (9th Cir. 1995); Moser
v. F.C.C., 46 F.3d 970 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2615 (1995).
223. See Destination Ventures, 46 F.3d 57.
224. See id. See also Moser, 46 F.3d 970.
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